

VZCZCXRO9946

PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR  
DE RUEHV L #0322 1291332  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 091332Z MAY 07  
FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1238  
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000322

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017

TAGS: PREL EUN ETRD KPAL LH RS MD

SUBJECT: LITHUANIA MAY INTERVENE ON MOLDOVA AT MAY 14 GAERC

REF: STATE 60948

Classified By: POL/ECON Chief Rebecca Dunham for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)  
)

¶1. (C) Summary: Lithuania may intervene at the May 14 GAERC on Moldova. The GOL sees little chance of making progress towards a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia given the current climate. They have suspicions that the secretive negotiations concluded between Russia and Moldova

SIPDIS

on Transnistria may be intended to strengthen the Russian argument that a negotiated solution is possible and necessary in Kosovo. End Summary.

-----  
Key Lithuanian Positions  
-----

¶2. (C) We delivered reftel points on the May 14 GAERC agenda items to Tomas Gulbinas, head of the MFA's Common Foreign and Security Policy Division May 8. Gulbinas told us that the GOL is puzzled by the secretive negotiations between Moldova and Russia on Transnistria; conclusions from these negotiations were leaked and published by analyst Vladimir Socor in mid-April. Gulbinas told us that the GOL may intervene at the May 14 GAERC on Moldova. He speculated that Russia was planning to use the reported talks in connection with UNSC negotiations on a resolution for Kosovo. He suspects that the GOR will use this negotiated settlement as evidence that a negotiated settlement is possible in Kosovo, and veto any resolution that is not agreed to by the Serbs. (Another MFA source told us that the GOL has invited Moldovan President Voronin to Vilnius June 2 to remind him of his non-Russian options.)

-----  
Russia-EU Summit  
-----

¶3. (C) Gulbinas told us that he does not expect any progress at this GAERC on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) for Russia. He noted that in the context of the attacks on the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, Russia not having resolved the Polish meat issue, Russia having called a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, threats made in relation to the missile defense system, moves against foreign investors in Russia, and no progress on resuming oil flows through the spur of the Druzhba Pipeline that feeds Lithuania's Mazeikiu Nafta Refinery, he doesn't see any window for potential progress. We asked Gulbinas which of these issues would be essential to GOL backing for the PCA; he said it would be restoration of oil flows to Mazeikiu Nafta and resolution of the Polish meat issue. He pointed out that the PCA was intended for countries that are engaging in rapprochement with the EU, not for those defying it.

-----

Kosovo

-----

¶4. (C) Gulbinas said that the GOL is strongly in support of a UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo's status. Gulbinas said that the GOL fears that a scenario involving each country individually acknowledging independence for Kosovo will portend difficulties in other frozen conflicts, most notably in the South Caucasus.

-----

Black Sea Region

-----

¶5. (C) Gulbinas told us that the Governments of Poland and Greece have some small reservations about the conclusions on the Black Sea Region as they stand now, but that by May 14 these should be addressed. He noted that these conclusions are not very substantive, and mostly give a mandate for further work.

-----

Other Issues

-----

¶6. (C) Gulbinas thanked the USG for the information on the other agenda items. He noted that the GOL agreed with many of the points included in the non-paper. He didn't expect any discussion at the GAERC of Austrian energy company OMV's decision to enter into a major gas deal with Iran.

CLOUD